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CONFRONTATION ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE CASES
Paul C. Giannelli
Weatherhead Professor of Law
Case Western Reserve University

The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." The confrontation clause was held binding upon the states in Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The U.S. Supreme Court's
most recent confrontation cases have involved the
testimony or statements of children in sexual abuse
prosecutions.
In addition, Article I, section 10 of the Ohio Constitution
provides that an accused has a right to "meet the
witnesses face to face." The Ohio Supreme Court's most
recent cases a!so have involved the testimony or state-

ments of children in sexual abuse prosecutions. Significantly, the Court has indicated that the Ohio Constitution
provides greater protection than its federal counterpart.
This article examines these developments. There are
several related but distinct aspects to the right of confrontation. There is (1) the right to be present at trial, (2) the
right to cross-examine adverse witnesses at trial, and (3)
the hearsay-confrontation issue, which involves the
deprivation of the right to cross-examine out-of-court
declarants.
THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT

At the very least, the right of confrontation guarantees
an accused the right to be present during trial. The U.S.
Supreme Court has commented: "One of the most basic
of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is
the accused's right to be present in the courtroom at
every stage of his trial." Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338
(1970). See also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Lewis v.
United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892).
This right precludes a trial in absentia unless the
defendant forfeits the right to be present at trial by obstreperous conduct, Illinois v. Allen, supra, or by failing to
attend the trial after its commencement. Taylor v. United
States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973). See also Crosby v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 748 (1993) (finding that Fed. Crim. R.
43 precludes a trial in absentia).

''Face-to-Face'' Confrontation
The right to be present includes the right to "face-to-

face" confrontation. The Supreme Court has found a
Sixth Amendment violation where a screen was used to
separate the accused and alleged child sexual abuse
victims during their testimony. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012
(1988). "[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees the
defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact." /d. at 1016. This requirement
is essential to the fairness and integrity of the fact-finding
process. "It is always more difficult to tell a lie about a
person 'to his face' than 'behind his back.' In the former
context, even if the lie is told, it will often be told less
convincinqlv:" /d. at 1019. In the Court's view, the importance of this right outweighs its drawbacks:
·
[F]ace-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the
truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the same
· token it may confound and undo the false accuser, or
reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult. It is a
truism that constitutional protections have costs.
/d. at 1020.
The Court declined to determine whether an exception
to face-to-face confrontation could be justified. The
record in Coy did not support such a finding: "Since
there have been no individualized findings that these
particular witnesses needed special protection, the judgment here could not be sustained by any conceivable
exception." /d. at 1021.
However, in an important concurring opinion, Justice
O'Connor noted that the right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute and the state interest in protecting the
child could outweigh the defendant's right if case-specific
findings of necessity are made by the trial court.ld. at 1022.

The Exception
Two years later, in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836
(1990), the Court rejected a confrontation challenge
where a child witness testified outside the courtroom via
closed circuit television. The Court adopted Justice
O'Connor's position:
[l]f the State makes an adequate showing of necessity,
the state interest in protecting child witnesses from the
trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is sufficiently
important to justify the use of a special procedure that
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permits a child witness in such cases to testify at trial
against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face
confrontation with the defendant.
The requisite finding of necessity must of course be a
case-specific on.e: The trial court must hear evidence and
determine whether use of the one-way closed circuit television procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the
particular child witness who seeks to testify. /d. at 855.
See generally Note, "Children as Witnesses After Maryland v. Craig," 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1993 (1992) (surveying
psychological literature).

the relationship between the hearsay rule and the
Confrontation Clause.
Since a hearsay declarant is, in effect, a witness, a
literal application of the Confrontation Clause would
preclude the prosecution from introducing any hearsay
evidence notwithstanding the applicability of a longrecognized hearsay exception. The U.S. Supreme Court
has never accepted this interpretation because it "would
abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a result long
rejected as unintended and too extreme." Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,63 (1980).
The Confrontation Clause also could be interpreted as
requiring only the right to cross-examine in-court
witnesses and not out-of-court declarants. Under this
view, all hearsay exceptions would satisfy constitutional
requirements. The Supreme Court also has rejected this
view. Although the Court has recognized that the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule "stem from the
same roots,' 1 it "has never equated the two." Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970). In another case the Court
stated it this way:
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules
and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed
to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to
suggest that the overlap is complete and that the
Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a
codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at common iaw. Our
decisions have never established such a congruence;
indeed, we have more than once found a violation of
confrontation values even though the statements in
issue were admitted under an arguably recognized
hearsay exception ... The converse is equally true:
merely because evidence is admitted in violation of a
long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been
denied. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970).
The Court recently reaffirmed this view: "We have been
careful 'not to equate the Confrontation Clause's prohibitions with the general rule prohibiting the admission of
hearsay statements.'" White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 741
(1992) (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990)).
Instead of either of the approaches discussed above,
the Court has attempted to steer a middle course, a task
that often has proved elusive. As McCormick's treatise
notes: "A discussion of constitutional limitations upon the
use of hearsay might well commence with the observation that their outline is somewhat less than clear."
McCormick, Evidence§ 252, at 749 (3d ed. 1984).

Ohio Cases
The Ohio Supreme Court addressed this issue in State
v. Eastham, 39 Ohio St.3d 307, 530 N.E.2d 409 (1988), a
case involving the use of a closed circuit camera to transmit the alleged rape victim's testimony into the courtroom.
Eastham was decided after Coy but before Craig. The
Court found a violation of both the federal and state
constitutions. The Court, however, also noted that a "more
particularized finding of necessity would first be required
for this court to employ an exception." /d. at 310. See also
R.C. 2907.41 (testifying via closed-circuit television).
In State v. Self, 56 Ohio St.3d 73, 564 N.E.2d 446
(1990), a 6 year old child abuse victim testified via a
videotaped deposition pursuant to R.C. 2907.41(A)(2).
Under this procedure, the victim was subject to crossexamination, the victim and defendant could see each
other via closed circuit television, and the defendant
could communicate with counsel.
Citing Craig, the Court held that the Ohio statute did
not violate the 6th Amendment. Similarly, the Court ruled
that the statutory procedure did not violate the Ohio
Confrontation Clause, adding that this Clause "provides
no greater right of confrontation than the Sixth Amendment." /d. at 79. Coy and Eastham, in the Court's view,
were distinguishable because the trial court in Self
"made a case-specific finding that the child witness
would be seriously traumatized by the presence of the
defendant." /d. at 81.
RIGHT OF CROSS-EXAMINATION
The right of confrontation also encompasses the right
of cross-examination. For example, in Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308 (1974), an accused was prohibited from
cross-examining a prosecution witness concerning the
witness's status as a juvenile probationer. This curtailment of cross-examination was based on a state statute
designed to protect the confidentiality of juvenile adjudications. On review, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed:
"The State's policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile offender's record cannot require yielding
of so vital a constitutional right as the effective crossexamination for bias of an adverse witness." /d. at 320.
See a/so Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968).
This aspect of the right of confrontation has not played
a significant role in the child abuse cases. If the child
testifies, there is no question that the defense has the
right to cross-examine the child.

OHIO v. ROBERTS
The Court's current confrontation jurisprudence in this
area can perhaps be best understood by examining Ohio
v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and its progeny.
In Roberts the Court identified two values underlying
the Confrontation Clause: the "Framers' preference for
face-to-face accusation" and an "underlying purpose to
augment accuracy in the factfinding process.'' /d. at 65.
From these values, the Court derived a two-pronged
analysis that focused on (1) the unavailability of the
declarant and (2) the reliability of the hearsay statement.
The Court wrote:
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for

CONFRONTATION AND HEARSAY
There are several possible interpretations for defining

2

writing that Roberts does not "stand for the radical proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by
the government without a showing that the declarant is
unavailable." /d. at 394.

cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause
normally requires a showing that [the declarant] is
unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible
only if it bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the
evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.
In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least
absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. /d. at 66.
This summation of confrontation requirements immediately raised problems. What is a "firmly rooted" hearsay
exception? Most of the hearsay exceptions in the Federal
Rules of Evidence reflect well-established exceptions.
Some, however, rest on rather shaky grounds. Are they
all "firmly rooted';? Moreover, does the widespread adoption of the Federal Rules by the states (now 36) demonstrate that the innovative exceptions are now "firmly
rooted" exceptions?
The Roberts' decision, however, also raised a far moie
significant issue. Although both the unavailability and
reliability requirements were independently recognized
in the Court's prior confrontation cases, the combination
of the two in Roberts was problematic. Roberts involved
the admissibility of a preliminary hearing transcript as
former testimony, a hearsay exception that traditionally
required a showing of unavailability. Most hearsay exceptions, however, do not require a demonstration of unavailability. Did the Court intend to impose an unavailability
requirement in every case?
This aspect of the opinion could have significant
repercussions. As one commentator noted: "Beneath
[Roberts1 apparently orthodox disposition ... lies an
interpretation of possibly far-reaching significance:' Lilly,
"Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts,"
36 U. Fla. L. Rev. 207, 224 (1984). Another writer pointed
out that the Roberts' "framework was immediately
controversial." Jonakait, "Restoring the Confrontation
Clause to the Sixth Amendment," 35 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
557, 558 (1988).

White v. Illinois
In 1992, the Court reaffirmed this position in White v.
Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992), a child sexual abuse prosecution, in which the child's hearsay statements were
admitted in evidence under two hearsay exceptions:
excited utterances and statements made for the purpose
of medical treatment. The statements had been made to
the child's mother and babysitter, as well as to a doctor,
nurse, and police officer. The child did not testify and
thus the principal issue was whether the prosecution had
to establish the unavailability of the child as a prerequisite to admitting the statements under these exceptions.
The Court, once again, held that the unavailability
requirement set forth in Roberts was limited to the former
testimony exception to the hearsay rule: "Roberts stands
for the proposition that unavailability analysis is a necessary part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only when
the challenged out-of-court statements were made in
the course of a prior judicial proceeding." /d. at 741
(emphasis added).
These two cases establish blanket rules dispensing
with the unavailability requirement for at least some
hearsay exceptions- the coconspirator exception in
lnadi and the excited utterance and medical diagnosis
exceptions in White. The Court offered two rationales for
these rulings.
"Better Evidence" Argument
First, the Court reasoned that the coconspirator, excited utterance, and medical diagnosis exceptions differ
from the former testimony exception at issue in Roberts.
Unlike former in-court testimony, coconspirator statements "provide evidence of the conspiracy's context that
cannot be replicated, even if the declarant testifies to the
same matters in court." /nadi, 475 U.S. at 395.
Similarly, the White Court noted that excited utterances
and statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis had substantial probative value that "could not be
duplicated simply by the declarant later testifying in
court." White, 112 S. Ct. at 743.
In short, the Court believed that the out-of-court statement is "better evidence" than the in-court testimony.
"When two versions of the same evidence are available,
longstanding principles of the law of hearsay, applicable
as well to Confrontation Clause analysis, favor the better
evidence." lnadi, 475 U.S. at 394.
This argument is flawed because it presupposes that
either the out-of-court statement or the in-court testimony
may be introduced at trial. There is no reason, however,
why both cannot be admitted in evidence in most trials.
Under the hearsay rule, statements falling within these
exceptions are admissible even if the declarant testifies.

THE UNAVAILABILITY REQUIREMENT
United States v. lnadi
Roberts' two-prong approach, requiring both reliability
and unavailability, was soon modified. In United States v.
lnadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986), the trial court admitted tapes
as coconspirator admissions under Federal Evidence
Rule 801(d)(2)(E). The defendant objected on confrontation grounds, arguing that the prosecution had failed to
establish the unavailability of the declarant as required
by Roberts.
Despite the broad language on unavailability in
Roberts, the /nadi Court limited Roberts to former
testimony cases. The Court declared:
Roberts should not be read as an abstract answer to
questions not presented in that case, but rather as a
resolution of the issue the Court said it was examining:
"the constitutional propriety of the introduction in
evidence of the preliminary hearing testimony of a
witness not produced at the defendant's subsequent
state criminal trial." /d. at 392-93 (quoting Roberts, 448
U.S. at 58).
Later in the opinion, the Court returned to this point,

''Burden-Benefit'' Argument
The second reason noted in these cases involved what
the Court believed to be an unnecessary burden on the
prosecution. The prosecution subpoenas those witnesses that it needs, and the defense is guaranteed the same
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opportunity under the Compulsory Process Clause. An
unavailability rule would operate only in those cases
where neither side wanted to call the witness. In the
Court's view, the benefit of an unavailability rule is therefore marginal. At the same time, keeping track of additional witnesses would impose "substantial burdens"
because the "prosecution would be required to repeatedly locate and keep continuously available each declarant."
White, 112 S. Ct. at 742.
Once, again, the Court's opinions are not persuasive.
The prosecution has to keep track of the state's witnesses. Typically, this means retaining their name, address,
telephone number, and place of employment, and issuing
subpoenas when necessary. The incremental burden of
keeping track of additional witnesses would often be
minimal. The declarant in lnadi failed to appear due to
car trouble, a rather unimpressive excuse.

THE RELIABILITY REQUIREMENT
Subsequent decisions also considered the reliability
prong specified in Roberts. Under this prong, a hearsay
statement satisfies confrontation requirements if the
statement (1) falls within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception or (2) possesses "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."

Bourjaily v. United States
The Court's first post-Roberts case on this issue was
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). Like Jnadi,
it involved coconspirator statements. Jnadi, however,
addressed only the unavailability issue. Bourjaily examined the reliability issue. Tracing the judicial history of the
coconspirator exception back over a century and a half,
the Court found the exception "firmly enough rooted in
our jurisprudence." /d. at 183. Accordingly, in the Court's
view, such statements automatically satisfy confrontation
demands for reliability. Longevity, by itself, seems to be
the talisman for determining whether an exception is
"firmly rooted."
Surprisingly, the Court failed to examine the underlying rationale for the exception, a rationale that "is not
altogether easy to grasp." Johnson, "The Unnecessary
Crime of Conspiracy," 61 Calif. L. Rev. 1137, 1183 (1973).
Unlike other exceptions, coconspirator statements are
not "regarded as carrying some particular guarantee of
trustworthiness." /d. at 1184. The federal drafters explicitly stated that admissions, such as coconspirator statements, are not based on a reliability rationale: "No
guarantee of trustworthiness is required in the case of an
admission." Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) advisory committee's
note. See also Davenport, "The Confrontation Clause
and the Coconspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis," 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1378, 1384
(1972) ("[T]he coconspirator exception has usually been
supported by a variety of theories unrelated to the trustworthiness of the evidence itself.").
Rather, the coconspirator exception is often justified on
agency principles- a "partners in crime" rationale. The
federal drafters recognized that the "agency theory of
conspiracy is at best a fiction." Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E)
advisory committee's note. The drafters nevertheless
failed to supply an alternative rationale. Professor

Mueller observes: "In terms of theory, [the rule] is an
embarrassment ... [l]t seems to have been created by
accident, and the one traditional explanation which
survives does not convince." Mueller, "The Federal
Coconspirator Exception: Action, Assertion, and Hearsay," 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 323, 324 (1984). Some commentators candidly admit that the principal justification for the
exception is "necessity" and not reliability. See Levie,
"Hearsay and Conspiracy: A Reexamination of the
CoConspirators' Exception to the Hearsay Rule," 52
Mich. L. Rev. 1159, 1166 (1954) ("Conspiracy is a hard
thing to prove .... Conspirators declarations are admitted out of necessity.").
Coconspirator statements sometimes are against the
penal interest of the declarant. But nothing in the coconspirator rule requires that the statement be against
interest when made: "the authorities agree that admissions of the agent ... are admissible whether or not he
thought the statements to be against his or his principal's
interest at the time he made them." Johnson, supra, at
1184. Federal Rule 804(b)(3) now recognizes an exception for statements against penal interest, and thus there
is no need for a separate coconspirator exception if the
"against interest" notion is the underlying rationale. This
exception, however, is more demanding than the coconspirator exception because it requires the unavailability
of the declarant.
The Court's casual treatment of the reliability issue in
Bourjai/y belies its stated concern for trustworthiness.

White v. Illinois
The Court adopted the same analysis in White, writing
that there "can be no doubt" that the excited utterance
and medical diagnosis exceptions are "firmly rooted."
The Court noted that the excited utterance exception has
been recognized for "at least two centuries" and that the
Federal Rules of Evidence and nearly "four-fifths" of the
states have adopted it. White, 112 S. Ct. at 742 n. 8.
Here, again, the Court overlooked the long-standing
criticism of the excited utterance exception. As early as
1928, commentators discussed the effect of stress on
perception. Hutchins & Slesinger, "Spontaneous Exclamations," 28 Colum. L. Rev. 432, 439 (1928) ("What the
emotion gains by way of overcoming the desire to lie, it
loses by impairing the declarant's power of observation"). The latest edition of McCormick's text contains the
following evaluation:
The entire basis for the exception is, of course, subject
to question. While psychologists would probably
concede that excitement minimizes the possibility of
reflective self-interest influencing the declarant's statements, they have questioned whether this might be
outweighed by the distorting effect of shock and excitement upon the declarant's observation and judgment."
2 McCormick on Evidence 216 (4th ed. 1992).
See also Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony 33 (1979) (discussing the effect of stress on perception); Stewart, "Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law
and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence," 1970 Utah
L. Rev. 1, 27.
The Court's treatment of the medical diagnosis exception is also flawed. As one commentator notes, this
exception "is not a centuries' old exception, since it Was
4

FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's statements in earlier
cases, the most recent decisions suggest that the right of
confrontation has been "deconstitutionalized" into the
hearsay rule. Under the Court's current analysis, "firmly
rooted" exceptions no matter how flawed are presumptively reliable. Moreover, at this time the unavailability
requirement has been applied only to former testimony.
Yet, traditional hearsay law always required unavailability
as a prerequisite for the use of former testimony, and
thus the Confrontation Clause adds little to the
safeguards already required by the hearsay rule.
One commentator has written: "The confrontation
clause is no longer a constitutional right protecting the
accused, but essentially a minor adjunct to evidence
law." Jonakait, supra, at 558. Another notes that the
Supreme Court "has transformed a constitutional guarantee into an evidentiary doctrine 'generally designed to
protect similar values,' as the hearsay rule." Berger, "The
Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A
Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model,'' 76 Minn.
L. Rev. 557, 557 (1992). See also Haddad, 'The Future of
Confrontation Clause Developments: What Will Emerge
When the Supreme Court Synthesizes the Diverse Lines
of Confrontation Decisions?," 81 J. Grim. L. & Criminology 77, 80 (1990) ("Because of these rules, the confrontation clause offers little protection beyond that afforded by
domestic hearsay iaw.").
Nevertheless, the Court has not formally adopted this
position, and challenges to hearsay statements should
continue to be made on both federal and state constitutional grounds. The Court has granted certiorari in a case
involving the declaration against penal interest exception
to the hearsay rule, Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). Williamson v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. 681 (1993). This will afford the
Court an another opportunity to resolve some of these
problems.
The Court has also failed to explain what appears to be
an inconsistency between the two lines of confrontation
cases discussed above: the face-to-face confrontation
cases (Coy and Craig) and the hearsay cases (White).
One writer put it this way:
[l]f a child is called to testify, no precautions such as
screens or televised testimony are allowed without a
showing of necessity. [Coy and Craig] Yet prosecutors
can refuse to call a child at all, offering no justification,
and obtain a valid conviction based solely on repetition
of the child's statements which meet the criteria for
firmly rooted hearsay exceptions. [White] Doubtless,
most defense counsel would rather cross-examine a
child who is hidden behind a screen or located in a
different room than have no opportunity at all for crossexamination. Raeder, supra, at 4.

firmly adopted only eighteen years ago in the Federal
Rules of Evidence. The [White] opinion does not mention
this." Swift, "Smoke and Mirrors: The Failure of the
Supreme Court's Accuracy Rationale in White v. Illinois
Requires a New Look at Confrontation," 22 Cap. L. Rev.
145, 155 (1993). Moreover, the Court's broad definition of
the exception "would seem to include anything the .
patient chooses to talk about with a doctor!" /d. at 157.

Particularized Guarantees of Trustworthiness
According to Roberts, a statement that does not fall
within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception satisfies
Confrontation Clause demands if it possesses particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. The Court
addressed this issue in a case involving the admissibility
of a child's statement under a residual hearsay exception. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). The Idaho
residual exception is patterned after the federal rule, an
exception that was not adopted in Ohio.
This trustworthiness requirement involves a case-bycase approach that considers the "totality of the circumstances" at the time the statement was made. These
factors include spontaneity, consistency of repetition, the
mental state of the declarant, use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, and lack of motivation to
lie. /d. at 806.
The Court ruled that after-the-fact corroboration cannot
be considered: "[T]he relevant circumstances include
only those that surround the making of the statement and
that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief." /d.
at 819. In rejecting reliance on corroborating proof, the
Court wrote:
[T]he use of corroborating evidence to support a hearsay statement's "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' would permit admission of a presumptively
unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial, a result we think at
odds with the requirement that hearsay evidence
admitted under the Confrontation Clause be so trustworthy that cross-examination of the declarant would
be of marginal utility. /d. at 823.
fhe Court did not extensively discuss Wright in White v.
'1/inois. The Court's dichotomy between "firmly rooted"
3xceptions, which are presumptively reliable, and those
3Xceptions that are not "firmly rooted," which require a
Jarticularized reliability analysis, seems questionable
IVhen the facts of the two cases are examined:
Ironically, the very statement that Was excluded in
Wright as violating the Confrontation Clause because it
did not demonstrate particularized indicia of reliability
was given by a two-and-one-half-year-old child to a
doctor. One wonders why the four-year-old child's
statement to the doctor and nurse in White should be
subject to different Confrontation Clause analysis than
the child's statements to the doctor in Wright. The
fortuity that the same type of statements were admitted
under different hearsay exceptions now appears to
govern the type of constitutional analysis ultimately
applied to such hearsay. Raeder, "White's Effect on the
Right to Confront One's Accuser," ABA Grim. Justice,
Winter 1993, No.4, at 2, 7.

OHIO CASES
The Ohio cases involving hearsay problems in child
abuse prosecutions first arose in cases interpreting the
excited utterance exception, Ohio R. Evid. 803(2). These
cases carved out an expansive exception in abuse cases.
See State v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St. 87, 524 N.E.2d 466
(1988) (statement made 15 hours after incident admitted).
Recently, the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged this
development. In State v. Taylor, 66 Ohio St.3d 295, 612
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N.E.2d 316 (1993), the Court wrote:
There is no per se amount of time after which a statement can no longer be considered to be an excited
utterance. The central requirements are that the statement must be made while the declarant is still under
the stress of the event and the statement may not be a
result of reflective thought.
Therefore the passage of time between the statement and the event is relevant but not dispositive of the
question.
Merely being "upset" clearly does not meet the
standard for admissibility under Evid. R. 803(2) because
it does not show that [the declarant's] statements were
not the result of reflective thought. /d. at 303.
The Court went on to distinguish cases in which an excited utterance is made by a sexually abused child. According to the Court:
In the cases of statements made by children who say
they were sexually assaulted, we have upheld the
admission of those statements even when made after
a substantial lapse of time, but in those cases we have
done so because we recognize that children are likely
to remain in a state of nervous excitement longer than
would an adult ...
This trend of liberalizing the requirements for an
excited utterance when applied to young children who

a;e the victims of sexual assault is also based on the
recognition of their limited reflective powers. Inability to
fully reflect makes it likely that the statements are trustworthy. /d. at 304.

STATE v. BOSTON
In State v. Boston, 46 Ohio St.3d 108, 545 N.E.2d 1220
(1989), a child sexual abuse case, the Supreme Court
considered the hearsay exception for statements made
for the purpose of medical diagnosis, Rule 803(4). The
Court identified a number of problematic aspects when
this exception is used in child abuse cases.
The first problem relates to the "motivational" rationale.
The underlying rationale of Rule 803(4) turns on the
motivation of the declarant- a person seeking medical
treatment would tell the truth. Boston questioned
whether this motivational factor applied to a young child:
"[S)uch a young child is not giving the doctor the information for the purposes required by Evid. R. 803(4).
More than likely, the child does not even want to be
seeing the doctor!" /d. at 122.
A second problem concerns whether the statement
must be made to a physician. Statements made to "a
psychologist, counselor, social worker, minister, etc."
pose a dilemma.
A third problem concerns the identification of the
perpetrator in the out-of-court statement. Is such an identification pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment?
The Court went on to create, under its inherent authority, its own hearsay exception for child abuse cases. The
Court concluded:
[A]n out-of-court statement of an allegedly abused
child of tender years, including identification of a
perpetrator, made to a qualified expert in child abuse,
is admissible if the expert has independent evidence

of physical or emotional abuse of the child, the child
has no apparent motive for fabricating the statement
and the child has been found unavailable after a goodfaith effort to produce the child in court. /d. at 127.
STATE v. DEVER
In State v. Dever, 64 Ohio St.3d 401, 596 N.E.2d 436
(1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1279 (1993), the Supreme
Court once again examined the medical diagnosis
exception, ruling that a statement made by a 4-year old
child to a pediatrician concerning sex abuse was admissible under Ohio Rule 803(4). In so holding, the Court
overruled Boston in part. As noted above, Boston questioned whether the motivational factor applied to a young
child. The Court in Dever found the Boston analysis too
"rigid." The Court wrote:
Once the child is at the doctor's office, the probability of understanding the significance of the visit is
heightened and the motivation for diagnosis and treatment will normally be present. That is to say, the initial
desire to seek treatment may be absent, but the motivation can certainly arise once the child has been
taken to the doctor. Absent extraordinary circumstances,
the child has no more motivation to lie than an adult
would in similar circumstances. Everyday experience
tells us most children know that if they do not tell the
truth to the person treating them, they may get worse
and not better. 64 Ohio St.3d at 410.
The Court also noted that Rule 803(4) was supported
by an additional rationale- that such statements are
reasonably relied on by the medical profession. In other
words, the expertise of physicians in evaluating the
accuracy of these statements is a safeguard against false
statements.
Nevertheless, these statements are not automatically
admissible. The trial court should consider the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, such
as improper influence or the use of suggestive or leading
questions. This additional requirement, which the Court
labeled "specific examination," applies "only to Evid. R.
803(4) and only to declarants of tender years." /d. at 412.

Identity of Assailant
In addition, the Court considered whether statements
identifying the perpetrator of the abuse are admissible
under Rule 803(4). The Court explicitly adopted the
reasoning of United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 438
(8th Cir. 1985), a controversial federal decision. See
Mosteller, "Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the
Purpose of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment," 67 N.C. L.
Rev. 257 (1989). According to the Dever Court, "statements made by a child during a medical examination
identifying the perpetrator of sexual abuse, if made for
[the) purpose of diagnosis and treatment, are admissible
pursuant to Evid. R. 803(4)." ld. at 414.

Confrontation
The Court also ruled that admission of the statement
did ~ot violate the defendant's right of confrontation, a
holdmg that tracks the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
White v Illinois. Citing White, the Ohio Supreme Court
held that "Evid. R. 803(4) is a firmly rooted hearsay
exception in the circumstances of the case before us." /d.
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at 418. In addition, "[i]n such a case, the prosecution is
not required to demonstrate the unavailability of the
declarant." /d.

EVIDENCE RULE 807
In Boston, the Court invited the Rules Committee to
examine the evidence issues raised in child abuse
cases. The Committee responded by drafting Ohio
Evidence Rule 807, which became effective in July, 1991.
This rule recognizes a residual hearsay exception in
child abuse cases.
Statements admissible under Rule 807 must satisfy six
conditions. First, the statement must have been made by
~child who is under the age of 12 at the time of the trial
Jr hearing. Second, the statement must describe a
>exual act performed by, with, or on the child, or it must
jescribe an act of violence directed at the child. Third,
he statement must be trustworthy. Fourth, the child's
n-court testimony must not be reasonably obtainable.
=ifth, the statement must be corroborated by independent
>roof. Sixth, the proponent must give pretrial notice of its
ntention to introduce a statement under this rule ten
lays before the trial or hearing.

.aterCases
In Dever, the Court noted the adoption of Rule 807, but
llso quoted a portion of the Staff Note which stated that
lule 807 recognized an exception "in addition to the
~xceptions enumerated in Evid. R. 803 and 804." Then,
1e Court commented that "the trial court in its discretion
letermines which hearsay exception, if any, would most
ppropriately support the admission of the child's statelents into evidence." /d. at 414. The dissent, however,
elieved that Dever "seriously undermines Evid. R. 807"
ecause it "will actually allow prosecutors to evade the
arefully considered controls of Evid. R. 807." /d. at 420.
In In re Coy, 07 Ohio St.3d 215, 616 N.E.2d 1105 (1993),
1e Court struck down R.C. 2151.35(F), which created a
~sidual hearsay exception for child abuse cases in juveile court. The Court ruled that this provision was inconistent with the Ohio Rules of Evidence and thus invalid
nder Section 5(8), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution,
hich empowers the Court to make procedural rules.
he Court also noted that "Evid. R. 807 should be used
'I trial courts in determining whether, in abuse cases, an
Lit-of-court statement(s) made by a child who, at the time
'trial (or hearing), is under the age of twelve years is
jmissible at the trial or hearing." /d. (syllabus 2).
See also State v. Black, 87 Ohio App.3d 724, 622
.E.2d 1166 (1993) (physician's testimony that abrasions
ere consistent with other causes in addition to sex
Juse did not satisfy the independent proof requirement).

Without overruling Dever, the Court significantly modified that holding. The third syllabus of Dever stated that
the admission of a "statement pursuant to a firmly rooted
hearsay exception does not violate a defendant's right of
confrontation." However, in Storch, the Court noted that
the applicability of the Ohio Constitution had not been
before the Court in Dever. The Court then stated that the
admission of a statement pursuant to a firmly rooted
hearsay exception "may violate our state constitutional
right of confrontation. The third paragraph of the syllabus
in Dever should be construed to that effect." /d. at 291.

Ohio Constitution
The Court ruled that the Ohio Constitution provides
greater confrontation protection than that provided by the
federal constitution. The Court noted that the current
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment by the U.S.
Supreme Court "provides less protection for the accused
than the protection provided by the Sixth Amendment as
traditionally construed and by the express Words of
Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution." /d. The
Ohio Constitution, in the Court's view, generally requires
a demonstration of the declarant's unavailability before
hearsay statements are unavailable:
We construe the right to confrontation contained in
Section 10, Article I to require live testimony where
reasonably possible. However, circumstances may
exist where the evidence clearly indicates that a child
may suffer significant emotional harm by being forced
to testify in the actual presence of a person he or she is
accusing of abuse. In such circumstances, the child
may be considered unavailable for purposes of the
Rules of Evidence and the out-of-court statements
admitted without doing violence to Section 10 Article I,
assuming Evid. R. 807 is otherwise satisfied. /d. at 293.
Evidence Rule 807
In Storch the Court also stated that "Evid. R. 807
accords with the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation
and of the confrontation rights in Section 10, Article I of
the Ohio Constitution. We believe that Evid. R. 807 is the
best way to protect both sets of confrontation rights,
especially those specifically set forth in the Ohio
Constitution." /d. at 289.
The Court also noted that Rule 807 contemplates a
pretrial hearing to determine the child declarant's availability. The Court added: ''A pretrial hearing would also
permit an interlocutory appeal if the trial court's ruling on
the child's availability and/or the admissibility of the
child's extrajudicial statements so hinders the state's
evidence that the state cannot proceed with its case." /d.
at 293.

STATEMENTS OF IDENTIFICATION
State v. Boston
As early as Boston, the Supreme Court cited Rule
801(D)(1)(c) as a possible vehicle for admitting the out-ofcourt statements of child abuse victims: "We suggest
that a better way of admitting a child's statements identifying the perpetrator of child abuse can be found, under
certain circumstances, in Evid. R. 801(D)(1)(c) rather than
Evid. R. 803(4)." /d. at 124.

STATE v. STORCH
In State v. Storch, 66 Ohio St.3d 280, 612 N.E.2d 305
~93), the Court once again addressed the hearsay
5ues in child abuse cases. Storch was sentenced to two
3 terms for rape. There was "virtually no proof ...
aced before the jury indicating that Storch was guilty
cept for the statements of A.M. [the victim] as related
'third parties." /d. at 284.
7

identifications were the focus of the rule. In other words,
identifications at lineups, showups, and photographic
displays would be admitted under this rule.
The court in State v. Turvey, 84 Ohio App.3d 724, 618
N.E.2d 214 (1992), discussed the effect Boston had in thl
Ohio cases applying Rule 801(D)(1)(c):
[A] difference exists between the thirteen pre-BostoJ
and the ten post-Boston Ohio appellate court cases
citing Evid. R. 801(D)(1)(c). The pre-Boston cases
generally involved identifications made by strangers tc
law enforcement personnel during the course of
investigations conducted shortly after the crime. The
stranger often, but not always, identified the defendan
among others in a line-up or photo array. In the preBoston cases, the identifications were necessary to
prove no other person committed the crime. /d. at 739.
By contrast, the majority ofthe post-Boston cases citin
[the rule] involved close relatives - two fathers, thre
stepfathers, and one uncle- of child victim-declarant~
The post-Boston identifications generally involved
identifications made by children to mothers or doctors
weeks or months after the crime. The child observed
neither the defendant nor the defendant's photograph
during the identification. In the post-Boston cases, the
identifications addressed not the identity of the defendant, but rather addressed the fact a crime was
committed. /d. at 740.
The court indicated that the rule had been misused in th
post-Boston cases: the rule "perhaps should not have
been cit~d or applied in the majority of the post-Boston
Ohio appellate cases citing the rule." /d. at 741.

This rule exempts statements from the hearsay rule if
the "declarant testifies at trial or hearing and is subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the
statement is ... (c) one of identification of a person soon
after perceiving him, if the circumstances demonstrate
the reliability of the prior identification."
The Court in Boston added: "Accordingly, admitting a
child's out-okourt identification of the perpetrator under
Evid. R'. 801(D)(1)(c), withoutthe child's testimony at trial,
requires the trial judge to conduct a voir dire examination
of the child at which the child, under oath, is subject to
cross-examination concerning her identification and responds willingly to questions about her identification." /d.

State v. Storch
In Storch the Supreme Court again commented on the
possible use of Evid. R. 801(0)(1) in child abuse cases:
We believe the live testimony of a child who has
claimed abuse will in most cases enhance the reliability of the fact-finding process. Videotaping or recording
the interviews in which the out-of"court statements of
the child are obtained would further enhance the
integrity of the fact-finding proceeding. In many
instances, Evid. R. 801(0)(1) or other Rules of
Evidence would allow for the admission of the audio
tapes or videotapes. If taping occurs and the tape is
actually admitted into evidence, the trier of fact would
have the benefit of the child's actual words and at least.
some insight as to the child's demeanor. The trial court
also would have the benefit of the actual questions or
conversation which led up to the child's indication that
an individual had abused the child. Certainly the questions asked can be a significant factor in determining
the reliability of the response, as the Supreme Court of
the United States acknowledged in Idaho v. Wright. In
that case the Supreme Court noted that leading questions could affect a small child's responses. Therefore,
such questions tended to make the responses less
reliable. 66 Ohio St.3d at 292.

CONCLUSION
The trial of child sexual abuse cases presents significant problems to both the prosecution and defense. The
U.S. Supreme Court has weaken the Confrontation
Clause in order to permit these prosecutions. In contras·
the Ohio Supreme Court has demonstrated greater
concern for recognizing the importance of confrontation
values in these trials.
For a further discussion of these issues, see Raeder,
"Navigating between Scylla and Charybdis: Ohio's
Efforts To Protect Children Without Eviscerating The
Rights of Criminal Defendants- Evidentiary Considera
tions And the Rebirth of Confrontation Clause Analysis i
Child Sexual Abuse Cases," 25 U. Toledo L. Rev. 43 (1994

Problems
There are several problems with the use of Rule 801(0)
(1)(c). First, the rule explicitly requires cross-examination
of the declarant "concerning the statement." See United
States v. Owen, 484 U.S. 554 (1988). Second, only an
"identification" is admissible under this provision.
Finally, the legislative history indicates that "stranger"
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